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HOW TO SHARE A CAKE WITH A SECRET AGENT
GUILLAUME CHE`ZE
Abstract. In this note we study a problem of fair division in the absence of
full information. We give an algorithm which solves the following problem:
n ≥ 2 persons want to cut a cake into n shares so that each person will get at
least 1/n of the cake for his or her own measure, furthermore the preferences
of one person are secret. How can we construct such shares?
Our algorithm is a slight modification of the Even-Paz algorithm and allows
to give a connected part to each agent. Moreover, the number of cuts used
during the algorithm is optimal: O
(
n log(n)
)
.
Introduction
Fair division is an old problem. The following situation already appears in the
Bible. Two persons (in the Bible Abraham and Lot) want to share a land. Fur-
thermore, this division must be fair. This means that each agent think that he or
she has obtained at least 1/2 of the land for his or her own point of view. The
following protocol, called “Cut and Choose”, is then used:
The first player cuts the land into two pieces with equal values for him or her. The
second player chooses one of the two pieces.
With this strategy each player get a connected piece with a value bigger than 1/2
for his or her point of view.
This protocol can also be used to divide a cake or an heterogeneous good as time
or computer memory between two agents. How can we generalize this protocol to
n agents?
Several answers exist. In order to describe them we need to precise some points.
We consider an heterogeneous good, for example: a cake, represented by the
interval X = [0, 1] and n agents with different points of view. We associate to
each agent a non-atomic probability measure µi on the interval X = [0; 1]. These
measures represent the utility functions of the agent. This means that if [a, b] ⊂ X
is a part of the cake then µi([a, b]) is the value associated by the i-th agent to this
part of the cake. As µi are probability measures, we have µi(X) = 1 for all i.
A division of X is a partition X = ⊔jXj where each Xj is given to one agent. Thus
there exists a permutation σ ∈ Sn such that µi is associated to Xσ(i). A division is
simple when each Xi is an interval.
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Several notions of fair division exists.
We say that a division is proportional when µi(Xσ(i)) ≥ 1/n.
We say that a division is envy-free when for i 6= j, we have µi(Xσ(i)) ≥ µi(Xσ(j)).
The problem of fair division (theoretical existence of fair division and construc-
tion of algorithms) has been studied in several papers [14, 8, 10, 9, 4, 12, 2], and
books about this topic, see e.g. [13, 5, 11, 3]. These results appear in the math-
ematics, economics, political science, artificial intelligence and computer science
literature. Recently, the cake cutting problem has been studied intensively by com-
puter scientists for solving resource allocation problems in multi agents systems,
see e.g. [7].
In this note we are going to study proportional fair divisions. This topic has been
very studied. Several algorithms already exist, see e.g. [13]. In order to describe
algorithms we thus need a model of computation. There exist two main classes
of cake cutting algorithms: discrete and continuous protocols (also called moving
knife methods). Here, we study only discrete algorithms. These kinds of algorithms
can be described thanks to the classical model introduced by Robertson and Webb
and formalized by Woeginger and Sgall in [16]. In this model we suppose that a
mediator interacts with the agents. The mediator asks two type of queries: either
cutting a piece with a given value, or evaluating a given piece. More precisely, the
two type of queries allowed are:
(1) evali(x, y): Ask agent i to evaluate the interval [x, y]. This means compute
µi([x, y]).
(2) cuti(x, α): Asks agent i to cut a piece of cake [x, y] such that µi([x, y]) = α.
This means: for given x and α, solve µi([x, y]) = α.
We remark that in the “Cut and Choose” algorithm only these two kinds of queries
are used.
In the Robertson-Webb model the mediator can adapt the queries from the previ-
ous answers given by the players. In this model, the complexity counts the finite
number of queries necessary to get a fair division. For a rigorous description of this
model we can consult: [16]
An optimal algorithm for proportional fair division has been given by Even and
Paz in [10]. When there are only two agents this algorithm corresponds to “Cut
and Choose”. When there are n ≥ 3 agents, this algorithm uses a recursive strategy
and it is sometimes called “Divide and Conquer”. Some properties of this approach
are studied in [6].
However, it seems that one property has never been studied. Indeed, in the “Cut
and Choose” algorithm the second agent do not give his or her preference. A par-
tition X = X1 ⊔X2 is given and the second player choose X1 or X2. The measure
µ2 is not used for the construction of the partition. Thus, with two agents, even
if one player do not participate to the construction of the partition, we can get a
proportional division. In this note, we are going to show that when there are n+1
agents we can construct a proportional fair division with connected portions even
if the measure of one agent is unknown. We call this agent the secret agent.
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One application suggested by the article [1] is the following: During a birthday
party with n guests and one host, a cake is divided into n + 1 pieces before it is
presented to the birthday boy or girl, but he or she gets any portion. In this article,
we give an algorithm which returns a partition assuring 1/(n + 1) of the cake to
each persons (the n guests and the host) for his or her own measure.
More precisely we are going to prove:
Theorem 1. Consider n+ 1 players and X = [0, 1].
We denote by Ej the set {1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1} \ {j}.
In the Roberston-Webb model, there exists an algorithm using only queries with the
first n players and giving a fair division X = ⊔n+1j=1Xj such that:
• each Xj is an interval,
• for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 1} there exists a bijection σj from {1, . . . , n} to
Ej such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
µi
(
Xσj(i)
)
≥
µi(X)
n+ 1
.
Furthermore, this algorithm uses at most O
(
n log(n)
)
queries.
This theorem says that the first n players can construct a partition X = ⊔n+1j=1Xj
without asking any queries to the n+ 1-th agent. Then, this last agent (the secret
agent) choose first a portion Xj . Therefore, this agent can choose a portion Xj
such that µn+1(Xj) ≥ µn+1(Xi) for i 6= j and then µn+1(Xj) ≥ 1/(n + 1). The
second part of the theorem says that the remaining portions Xi can be allocated
to the other agents in such a way that each agent obtained at least 1/(n + 1) for
his or her own measure.
This theorem asserts that we can obtain a proportional fair division in the absence
of full information. Indeed, no query is asked to the n+1-th player. The preferences
of this player are secret. We do not know at the end of the division what is the
value of µn+1(Xj). This is the reason why we call this last agent a secret agent.
The “Divide and Conquer” algorithm presented by Even and Paz in [10] ask
queries to all agents and then cannot be used to prove Theorem 1.
Indeed, if there are 4 agents this algorithm ask to each agent the query cuti(0, 1/2).
This gives four cut-points ci. We can suppose without loss of generality that
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3 ≤ c4. Then the first and the second agent apply the “Cut and
Choose” algorithm on [0, c2] and the third and fourth agent do the same on [c2, 1].
The first step of this algorithm prevent its use with a secret agent. However, we
will see in the next section that this approach can be modified and used with a
secret agent.
Other protocols can be modified and used with a secret agent. However, the com-
plexity of these algorithms will be bigger than O
(
n log(n)
)
. The benefit of the
modification of the “Divide and Conquer” protocol is the following: it leads to an
optimal algorithm. Indeed, it has been proved in [16, 9] that a proportional fair
division needs at least O
(
n log(n)
)
queries in the Robertson-Webb model.
We remark that our proportional fair division method cannot be generalized
with more than one secret agent. Indeed, suppose that we have n + 2 agents and
2 agents are secret agents, i.e. we cannot ask queries to them, they do not par-
ticipate to the construction of the division. Suppose also that the n agents give
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a partition X = ⊔n+2j=1Xj . If the two secret agents have measure µn+1, µn+2 such
that µn+1(X1) = µn+2(X1) = 1, then it is impossible to obtain a proportional fair
division for these n+ 2 agents with this partition.
We can also remark that we cannot obtain the same result for envy-free divi-
sion. Indeed, Stromquist in [15] has proved that there exist no algorithm in the
Roberston-Web model giving a simple (connected) and envy-free fair division for
n ≥ 3 players.
However, it has been proved in [1] that simple and envy-free divisions theoretically
exist even if the preferences of one person are secret. This means that this kind of
partition exists but cannot be obtained with an algorithm in the Robertson-Webb
model.
In the next section, we give a slightly modified version of the “Divide and Con-
quer” algorithm in order to prove Theorem 1.
1. A modified “Divide and Conquer” algorithm
DC secret
Inputs: X = [a, b], a list l = [µ1, . . . , µn] of n players.
Outputs: A partition of X .
(1) If n = 1 then c1 := cut1(a, 1/2).
Return(X = [a, c1] ∪ [c1, b]).
(2) If n > 1 is odd then
For i from 1 to n do
ci := cuti(a, µi(X)/2)
End For.
Sort the set {c1, . . . , cn} in order to have: ci1 ≤ ci2 ≤ · · · ≤ cin .
SetXL := [a, cn+1
2
],XR = [cn+1
2
, b], l1 := [µi1 , . . . , µin+1
2
−1
], l2 := [µin+1
2
+1
, . . . , µin ].
Return
(
DC secret(XL, l1)⊔ DC secret(XR, l2)
)
.
(3) If n > 1 is even then
For i from 1 to n do
ci := cuti
(
a, µi(X)
n+1
)
,
End For.
Compute ci0 := mini=1,...,n(ci).
Set XL := [a, ci0 ] and l
′ := l \ [µi0 ].
Return
(
XL⊔ DC secret([ci0 , b], l
′)
)
.
Proof. We are going to prove by induction Theorem 1. We consider the following
claim:
Hn: The algorithm DC secret applied with n measures returns a partition satisfying
the conclusion of Theorem 1.
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For n = 1, H1 is true. Indeed, in this case the algorithm DC secret gives the
same partition as the “Cut and Choose” algorithm.
Now, we suppose that Hk is true for k ≤ n− 1.
If n is even then the algorithm returns X = XL ⊔DC secret(X
′, l′), where X ′ =
X\XL and l
′ is a list of n−1 measures. By constructionXL is an interval. Without
loss of generality we can suppose that l′ = [µ2, . . . , µn].
As Hn−1 is true we get: X = XL ⊔
n+1
j=2 Xj , where Xj are intervals and for all
j ∈ {2, . . . , n, n+1} there exists a bijection σj from {2, . . . , n} to {2, . . . , n+1}\{j}
such that for all i in {2, . . . , n} we have
µi
(
Xσj(i)
)
≥
µi(X
′)
n
.
Furthermore, for i ≥ 2, we have µi(XL) ≤
µi(X)
n+1 and µi(X
′) = µi(X) − µi(XL).
Thus
µi(X
′) ≥
n
n+ 1
µi(X).
It follows
µi(Xσj(i)) ≥
µi(X)
n+ 1
.
Moreover, by construction, we have µ1(XL) = µ1(X)/(n+ 1).
This proves the theorem when the secret agent chooses a portion Xj and j ≥ 2.
It remains thus to prove the theorem when the secret agent chooses the portion
XL. However, in this situation the agent with associated measure µ1 plays the role
of the secret agent in DC secret(X \XL, l
′) and we get the desired result.
If n > 1 is odd then the algorithm returnsX = DC secret(XL, l1)⊔DC secret(XR, l2).
Without loss of generality we can suppose that l1 = [µ1, . . . , µn+1
2
−1] and l2 =
[µn+1
2
+1, . . . , µn].
By our induction hypothesis we get:
X =
n+1
2⊔
j=1
Xj
n+1⊔
j= n+1
2
+1
Xj.
We set XL = ⊔
n+1
2
j=1Xj and XR = ⊔
n+1
j= n+1
2
+1
Xj .
Suppose that the secret agent chooses a portion Xj where j ≤
n+ 1
2
, (the other
situation is similar).
As Hn+1
2
is true, there exists a bijection σ1 from the set {1, . . . ,
n+1
2 − 1} to
{1, . . . , n+12 } \ {j} such that for all i in {1, . . . ,
n+1
2 − 1} we have
µi(Xσ1(i)) ≥
µi(XL)
n+1
2
.
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By construction, we have for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n+12 − 1}, µi(XL) ≥ µi(X)/2. This
gives,
µi(Xσ1(i)) ≥
µi(X)
n+ 1
, for all i ∈
{
1, . . . ,
n+ 1
2
− 1
}
.
In the same way, we consider the sub-cake XR, players with associated mea-
sures µn+1
2
+1, . . . , µn and the agent with measure µn+1
2
as a secret agent. By
construction, this last agent is such that
µn+1
2
(XR) = µn+1
2
(X)/2.
Furthermore, XR is divided in (n+1)/2 parts, thus there exists a portion Xk such
that
µn+1
2
(Xk) ≥
µn+1
2
(XR)
n+1
2
.
We deduce
µn+1
2
(Xk) ≥
µn+1
2
(X)
n+ 1
.
As before, as Hn+1
2
is true, we get: there exists a bijection σ2 from the set
{n+12 + 1, . . . , n} to {
n+1
2 + 1, . . . , n+ 1} \ {k}, such that for i ∈ {
n+1
2 + 1, . . . , n}
we have
µi(Xσ2(i)) ≥
µi(X)
n+ 1
.
From the bijection σ1 and σ2 we can construct a bijection σ giving the conclusion
of the theorem.
The complexity study is classical and is the same as the one done for the usual
“Divide and Conquer” algorithm: the number of steps is in O
(
log(n)
)
and the
number of queries in each step is in O(n). This gives the desired complexity. 
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